On Tuesday night, Rabbi Yitzchak Breitowitz, Senior Lecturer at Yeshivas Ohr Somayach and a world-renowned speaker, spoke at the Yiboneh Center in Yerushalayim. Rabbi Breitowitz discussed Parshas Bo and the concept of free will.

The Rambam, in Hilchos T’shuvah, teaches that every person can be as righteous as Moshe or as evil as Y’rav’am ben N’vat. Hashem does not determine whether a person is good or evil. Any system of reward or punishment cannot function without free will. The Rambam considers free choice fundamental; without it, there is no reason to do t’shuvah, and t’shuvah would be impossible.

At the time, there was a strong current in Islamic philosophy that claimed that it was impossible for humans to have free will. Their reasoning was that every action in the universe is governed by G-d, making the idea of free will impossible.

The Rambam responds that this depends on how one defines G-d’s will. G-d wants me to have the capacity to desecrate Shabbos; it is my choice whether to keep Shabbos. Goodness is only goodness if it is chosen. Without free choice, true goodness can never be achieved. In other words, evil exists as a necessary contrast to attain the highest level of goodness.

He quoted the famous rabbinic statement: “Everything is in the hands of Heaven except the fear of Heaven.” It is our decision whether to serve G-d. If we truly wish to serve Him, He will provide inspiration and opportunities to do so. If we choose not to serve Him, those opportunities may not be presented. “The way you want to go is the way G-d directs you.”

Rabbi Breitowitz then posed the question: Can I pray for another person to do t’shuvah? The simple answer is no. Yet, there is a Gemara about Bruriah, whose husband Rabbi Meir wanted to pray that G-d remove his enemies from the world. Bruriah said that this was not the proper attitude; instead, one should pray for them to do t’shuvah, thus removing evil through transformation rather than destruction.

How could Bruriah say this? The Maharsha asks: How can you pray for an evil person to do t’shuvah if that person does not want to repent? He does not answer the question. The Chazon Ish says that the power of t’filah is so great that it can override free will. Rav Elyashiv, however, explains that one cannot pray for someone else to do t’shuvah directly. Instead, one can pray that Hashem sends people and experiences to inspire them.

Rav Elyashiv clarifies that Bruriah meant that one should pray that Hashem place experiences in a person’s life to motivate him toward t’shuvah. In this way, how we relate to others may literally change the direction of their lives.

Rambam raises two questions about free choice. In the Covenant of the Parts, Hashem told Avraham that his children would be strangers in a land not theirs, enslaved and afflicted for 400 years. Hashem would punish the nation that enslaves them, and the Jews would leave with great wealth. The Rambam explains that G-d decreed the Jews would be enslaved and persecuted, but He did not specify which people would enslave them. We must differentiate between the event and the actors in the event. G-d has a plan that will unfold, but the individual actors have free will. They are accountable for the evil they commit. Consequences are divinely decreed, yet the actors remain free agents.

Chazal say that G-d looked into the Torah and created the world. The Torah predates the universe; it is the blueprint for creation. G-d creates parents because the Torah commands us to honor them. The Torah does not respond to human conditions; rather, the mitzvos dictate human conditions because the Torah is the blueprint. Details of physical reality reflect spiritual truths in the Torah.

G-d has a plan for the world, and it will be accomplished. He coordinates decisions to advance His plan, and there are many possible actors to fulfill it. A scientist seeks consistency, predictability, and laws. Such expectations only make sense if one believes in a guiding intelligence directing the world. Without G-d, the scientific quest would be incoherent.

The Rambam’s second question concerns G-d hardening Pharaoh’s heart. The implication is that Pharaoh might have relented, but Hashem did not want that. The Maharal says that G-d hardened Pharaoh’s heart so he would remain impervious to the breaking of his will that the plagues might have caused, allowing him to make a conscious decision.

The Rambam, however, points out that Pharaoh hardened his own heart during the first five plagues. The Torah only says that G-d hardened his heart in the second half of the plagues. Hashem has an intricate system of punishment, sometimes in this world or the next. Sometimes it involves death or loss of function. One purpose is that a habitual rasha, who sins repeatedly by choice, may lose free will as part of punishment for earlier sins. Pharaoh said no five times at the beginning, so Hashem removed his free will to ensure that he received punishment for his initial volitional rebellion.

In the Rambam’s introduction to Pirkei Avos, he discusses the idea that loss of free choice can be a punishment for habitual, volitional sin. Rabbi Breitowitz explained that this can be compared to addiction: One is accountable for the decision to become addicted, and consequences follow naturally.

By Susie Garber